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LIST OF PARTIES BEFORE THIS COURT
The list of the parties before this Court are reflected in the caption of the case.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court obtains statutory jurisdiction over this first degree felony conviction
poured over by the Supreme Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1953, as amended); 78-2a-3(j).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Issue
1. Did the trial court abuse discretion when it sentenced Mr. Cruz solely
based on alienage to prison instead of the recommended jail and probation sentence?
2.

Did the trial court sentencing decision violate the equal protection clause as

it disparately treated defendant - a non-citizen - differently from citizen defendants.
B.

Preservation of Issue and Propriety of Review
The issue raised here was properly preserved below. See R. 58. (defendant

inquiring as to the propriety of the prison sentence when he was under the impression
he would get one-year jail term and probation. Accordingly, review is proper in this
Court. Further, even if not properly preserved in the court below, as trial counsel
could not have preserved his own ineffectiveness for appellate review, see State v.
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 n.3 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah
1993), this Court should nonetheless review the issues raised because of the
significant constitutional implications. In the alternative, this Court should apply the
"plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" doctrine to failure to preserve the issues.

1

See Utah R. Evid. 103(d); Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35 & nn.7-12; State v. Sepulveda, 842
P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
C.

Standard of Appellate Review
1. The standard of review is whether the district court abuse discretion when it

sentenced defendant to prison. "A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless
the trial court has abused discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or
imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nutall, 861 P.2d
454, 456 (Utah Ct. Appp. 1993); accord State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App. 432,114,
82P.3dll67.
2.

With respect to defendant's claim that he was deprived equal protection of

the law at sentencing, whether a district court's ruling is constitutionally sound is a
question of law reviewed de novo. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah
1995).
3. A plain error analysis requires this Court to view the trial record as a
whole to determine if the claimed errors seriously affected the fairness of the trial
and thus review is for correctness. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah
1996); State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 & nn.7-12 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S.
814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v. TarnawieckU 2000 UT App. 1 8 6 , 1 6 5 P.3d
1222.

2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to
resolving this case, the relevant portions of which are reproduced verbatim in
Addendum A:
United States Constitution, Amendment V;
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV;
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 24;
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37A-5
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(3) (2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2004);

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case
The defendant was originally charged with two first degree felony counts of

Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute in a drug-free zone, in
violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(3), one second-degree felony of Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute in a drug-free zone, in violation of
U.C.A. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(3), and one class B misdemeanor, Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37A-5. R. at 17. On October 7, 2004,
Defendant plead guilty to count 2, a first degree felony, and the three remaining
charges were dismissed.
3

Defendant was sentenced on November 18, 2004. The Pre-Sentence Report
(PSR) recommended that defendant serve one year in jail, noting that after
incarceration defendant would be delivered to Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) for immediate removal from the United States. The State
argued for a more severe sentence, while Defendant's counsel argued for a
sentence no longer than one year, preferably to be served in the county jail. R. at
50.
B.

Course Of Proceeding and Disposition

There were no pre-trial motions of significance filed by the parties. After
entering the guilty pleas, the district court sentenced defendant on November 18,
2005, to an indeterminate prison term of five years to life. R. at 51. Thereafter, in
a document dated November 19, 2004, and stamped by the court on December 7,
2004, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea,1 claiming he did not
understand the consequences of the pleas. See R. at 58. On December 7, 2004, the
District Court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea. R. at 59-60;
Addendum B. An appeal ensued to this Court on December 6, 2004. R. 53-54.
On April 15, 2005, the Legal Defenders office filed an Anders brief2 on
1

Defendant's guilty pleas may not have been knowing and voluntary in light of his
refusal to acknowledge that he understood that he would get five to life in prison as
opposed to one year in jail See R. at 58. However, for other reasons, Defendant does not
challenge the voluntariness of the underlying plea.
2

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
4

behalf of the Defendant. The State thereafter filed its concurrence with the Legal
Defenders Office's Anders brief on May 12, 2005. Thereafter, Defendant retained
new counsel, who files the instant brief.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Roy Cole represented the defendant below at both the plea hearing and
sentencing. The defendant used a court interpreter for translation purposes as noted
throughout the record and the docket. During the plea hearing, the judge told
defendant to say yes or si and not just "grunt noises" (Plea 1. p. 6 line 7).
The defendant claims that he was under the impression that he would be
pleading to a second degree felony. R. at 58. The defendant, through a hand-written
letter written in third person, informed the trial judge of this, and the judge ruled that
no withdrawal of plea was warranted R. at 59, 60.
The PSR recommended one year of jail time. Mr. Cole, defendant's counsel,
urged the court to follow the recommendation. The State argued against the
recommendation. Sent. T. at 3.
The prosecution initially represented to the judge that an admission had been
made by the defendant, but then backed away from that representation stating that he
did not remember whether or not an admission had truly been made. Sent. T. at 4.
Mr. Parmley mentioned "owe sheets" that had been recovered in the search, and
Defense counsel never offered a separate explanation nor objection.

5

The court asked the probation officer how much time defendant would serve at
state prison if sentenced to a first degree felony, and the probation officer did not
know. Sent. T. at 4, 5. The court commented that many "illegals" were given
suspended sentences then later deported. In this case, according to the judge, the
quantity of drugs was higher and merited prison time. Sent. T. at 5 and 6. Defendant
should be an "example." Sent. T. at 6. The court sentenced defendant to five years to
life at state prison. Sent. T. at 6.
This appeal then followed. R 53-54.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judge, as he recognized, has the option of sentencing defendant to
one year in jail and probation or to prison for an indeterminate period of five years
to life. Although the judge recognized that the sentencing recommendation was for
a jail term and probation, the Court nonetheless chose to employ defendant as "an
example," and opting to send defendant to prison for five years solely because of
his alienage.
The trial court clearly abused discretion by basing his sentencing decision
solely on the fact that defendant is a non-citizen. Unlike other cases before this
Court in which the court may have imposed prison term because of the difficulty of
monitoring probation internationally, the district court in this case upped
defendant's sentence solely on the basis of alienage.

6

When a state lays unequal hand on similarly situated defendants, the strictest
judicial scrutiny is employed, requiring the state to show a compelling interest for
the invidious discrimination. By denying defendant the option of a jail term and
probation solely because of alienage, the district court abused discretion and
committed reversible constitutional error.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED DISCRETION BY REFUSING
TO FOLLOW THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE
PROBATION DEPARTMENT THAT DEFENDANT BE PLACED
ON PROBATION AND INSTEAD IMPOSED AN
INDETERMINATE PRISON TERM ON THE BASIS OF
DEFENDANT'S ALIENAGE.
The sentencing decision of a trial court is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. Helms, 2000 UT 12, f 8,40 P.3d 426; State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907,909 (Utah
Ct. App. 1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when "it can be said that no reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court. Id. The Supreme Court has
found an abuse of discretion where, for example, fails to appropriately follow statutory
precepts. See, e.g., State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998).
The district court has the option of sentencing defendant to probation. See
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1; see also State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App.
1991) (sentence of probation is not a right but one which is meted out if it best serves
the interest of justice and is compatible with public interest). However, the court
7

declines to follow the recommendations of the probation department because it wants
to make an example of the defendant, such that non-citizens will be wary of
committing serious drug offenses. See Sent. Transcript at 5-6. (Court stating that "it
is not uncommon ... to receive recommendations from the probation department... on
people who are here illegally to ... give them a suspended prison sentence ... [But]
when you commit a very serious crime, which this is [and you are non-citizen], that
there ought not to be court probation."
The trial court expressed no such concern for citizens who commit serious drug
offenses: they are always eligible for probation if recommended by the probation
department. See id. Rather, the court's ire was reserved for non-citizens who commit
serious drug offenses. However, there is no requirement in § 77-18-1 that only noncitizens be sentenced beyond the guidelines recommended by the probation department.
Accordingly, as glaringly exposed by the district court's pronouncements, the only
reason the defendant drew a stiffer sentence than recommended by the probation
department was solely because of his non-citizen status in the United States - a factor
which should have no bearing on whether defendant was probation-eligible. Phrased
differently, the trial court's decision to sentence defendant to prison is patently "unfair"
and constitutes an abuse of discretion. See State v. Helms, supra.
The record in the instant case shows that defendant has no prior criminal record.
They have four children, 16, 13, 9, 6, two of which are US Citizens. He held a job at a

8

factory in Ogden and later Logan for over ten years. The probation department gave
him favorable recommendation after having compared his background and
circumstances to other similarly situated persons who have committed serious drug
offenses. Yet, the court declined to impose probation because of defendant's
citizenship status. This is an abuse of discretion, which this Court should reverse. See
State v. GallU supra.
POINT II
AS APPLIED, THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION PURSUANT
TO SECTION 77-18-1 VIOLATED THE EQUAL PROTECTION
GUARANTEES IN THE CONSTITUTIONS THAT SIMILARLY
SITUATED PERSONS NOT BE TREATED DISPARATELY.
The district court's application of § 77-18-1 violates equal protection and
uniform operation of laws by differentiating between a citizen defendant who may be
placed on probation upon recommendation by the probation department and a noncitizen defendant who is ineligible for probation because of his alienage.
The Equal Protection clause provides protection to all persons similarly
situated, forbidding the states to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 24.3

3

There are three methods for testing classifications of a statute under the equal
protection clause. One is the "facial challenge," meaning that the law on its own face and
terms disparetly classifies people. The second is the "as applied challenge," contesing
that while the statute shows no classification the official applying the law are applying it
with fifferent degrees of severity. The third is the "purpose and effect challenge," raising
the question whether the law is being in relaioty meant to burden different clases or
9

When legislation creates classifications that impinge upon a fundamental interest, the
statute is upheld only if it furthers a compelling state interest. See State in the Interest
of MR., 967 P.2d 951, 953-54 (Utah App. 1998). It is also axiomatic that when a State
discriminates a person on the basis of alienage, the reviewing court must apply the
strict scrutiny. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62, 100 S.Ct. 2286 (1980) (strict
scrutiny test requires that "the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state
interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully
scrutinized"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (1971); State v.
Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 1989), questioned on other grds. by State v. Mohi, 901
P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995) (statute must be reasonable in relation to state's need to
enact it).
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution similarly requires that all laws have
uniform operation. See Utah Const, art. I, § 24. At least in the context of economic
legislation, this constitutional protection is as rigorous as the protection provided by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah
1989). The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the tests of "strict scrutiny" and
"rational basis" are not helpful in assessing whether legislation violates the uniform

persons differently. See Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law : Substance
and Procedure, §18.4, p.41 (2d d.). The instant case raises a variety of the last two
challenges.
10

operations of the law provision. See Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc±, 903 P.2d 423,
426 (Utah 1995). Rather than employing strict scrutiny or rational basis tests, the
analysis for determining whether a statute violates Article I, section 24 is "(1) whether
the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the legislative objectives are legitimate, and
(3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the two." Id. at 426 (citing Blue
Cross, 119 P.2d at 637).
I h z right in a criminal case to be sentenced non-disparately is clearly of
fundamental importance. See,e.g.9 State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996)
(right at sentencing to present mitigating evidence fundamental); Wanosik, 2001 UT
App. 241, f 30, 31 P.3d 615 626 (sentencing is a critical stage in criminal proceedings),
affd 79 P.3d 937 (Utah 2003); Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1267 (10th Cir.
1986) (disparate treatment at sentencing could violate equal protection guarantee);
Julian, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) (referring to deprivation of due process in a
criminal proceeding as a fundamental right); Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ^20, 5 P.3d
616 ("A just and peaceful society must secure by law the fundamental rights of all its
citizens"; these fundamental rights include criminal law sanctions); accord State v.
Merrill 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585, 2005 WL 1367368 (Utah). Moreover, these due
process rights directly implicate the right to liberty and therefore are fundamental. See
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919 (1991) (further citation
omitted) ("Every person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the

11

Government may not punish him unless and until it proves his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with the relevant
constitutional guarantees.")- Because, as applied here, the ruling in the district court
directly subjugates a non-citizen criminal defendant's exercise of his liberty interests
compared to that of a citizen, the district court's decision is subject to strict judicial
scrutiny under equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc^
903 P.2d at 426; State v. Bell, 785 P.2d at 398; State v. Rodriguez, 2002 UT App. 119,
46 P.3d 767, n.l (noting that classification based on alienage is subject to strict
scrutiny).4
The State clearly does not have a compelling need to up the sentence of a noncitizen defendant solely because of alienage. In fact, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a state criminal procedure may not disparately treat similarly situated
defendants lest an equal protection violation occurs. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110 (1942) ("When the law lays an unequal hand on those
who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense . . . It has made an
invidious discrimination as if it had selected a particular group for oppressive
treatment."). Because the district court articulated no compelling treatment for treating
defendant disparately from other defendants who are citizens, the district court's

4

In Rodriguez, this Court specifically declined to rule on whether the sentenced meted
out to defendant violated the equal protection clause. See 2002 UT App. 119, f 4.
12

application of Section 77-18-1 violates equal protection.
Application of Article I, Section 24 uniform operations of the law test also
demonstrates that the district court's application of § 77-18-1 is unconstitutional as I
applied here. If the requirement to sentence a defendant to probation is usually

\

followed particularly when the probation department so recommend, a decision to

\

depart from such procedure only with respect to a non-citizen becomes indefensible
under the uniform operation of the law clause.
In sum, the district court has created two classes of people not required by the
statute: non-citizen defendants and citizen defendants. The classes, as here, have been
subjected to significantly disparate treatment solely on the basis of alienage. In
addition, there are no compelling legislative objectives warranting the disparate
treatment. There is no reasonable objective to warrant such disparity between citizen
defendants who may be eligible for probation notwithstanding first degree felony drug
conviction - as clearly recommended here by the probation department - and noncitizen defendants who the district court simply to chose to use as an example. In State
v. Nolfi, 141 N.J. Super. 528, 358 A.2d 853 (NJ 1976), following the dictates of the
Supreme Court in Skinner, the Court specifically held that a state statute prohibiting
non-institutionalized rehabilitation treatment to non-citizens while affording the same
to citizens violated the equal protection clause. Cf. State v. Orsman, 108 P.3d 1287
(Wash. App. 2005) (finding no equal protection violation when the judge simply

13

factors in alienage as a reason to deny non-institutionalize treatment to a convicted
sexual predator).
The instant case, if distinguishable from Skinner and Nolfi, is only on the ground
of degree but not of substance. The essence of the district court sentencing
pronouncement is to teach defendant - a non-citizen - a lesson, and to use him as "an
example" that "when you commit a very serious crime, which this is [and you are noncitizen], that there ought not to be court probation." Sent. Transcript at 5-6.
Defendant reiterates that he raises no wholesale, facial constitutional challenge
to § 77-18-1. Axiomatically, whenever possible, a statute must be interpreted so as not
to conflict with constitutional requirements. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1009; State
v. Rodriguez, 46 P.3d 767. The district court's application of § 77-18-1 violates equal
protection for the reasons stated above, and was an abuse of the court's discretion.
Accordingly, that application should be rejected and this Court should remand for
further proceedings consistent with the equal protection guarantees.
CONCLUSIONS AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the reasons specified above, this Court should reverse the decision of the
district court and remand the matter for proceedings, ordering a sentence of one year
for defendant, followed by supervised release, and other proceedings consistent with
the Court's opinion.

14

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of September, 2005.
KEEN LAW OFFICES, LLC

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

K-JCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's
Opening Brief was mailed by first-class postage prepaid this 16 TH day of September,
2005, to:
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Karen A. Klucznik
Assistant Attorneys General for the State of Utah
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
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Addendum A
Determinative Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 24;
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37A-5
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound,
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal,
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body
in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture
with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will
be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert,
produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject,
ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in
violation of this act. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a person
under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person making the
delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, magazine,
handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the
advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who violates this
subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(3) (2004)
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2004)
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement.
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Defendant.

The Court received a letter signed by the Defendant but written in third-person, as though
someone else wrote it about him. Giving the letter the most liberal interpretation in favor of the
Defendant, the Court treats the letter as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because the Defendant
thought that he was pleading guilty to a second degree felony, not a first degree felony. The Court
denies the motion.
After reviewing the written plea agreement and the video tape of the plea colloquy on
November 18,2004, the Court has no doubt that the Defendant understood perfectly that he was
pleading guilty to a first degree felony, carrying a prison sentence of five years to life. Further, he
signed, and acknowledged in court that he understood, the plea agreement written in English
with a parallel in the Spanish language. During all phases of the oral plea-colloquy, a certified
court interpreter translated to Spanish all English spoken by the Court and his counsel, and she
translated all Spanish spoken by Defendant to English. At no time did Defendant say that he did
not understand the agreement or otherwise convey uncertainty about the category of crime to
which he was pleading or about the plea agreement. The Court finds no reasonable basis for
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Defendant to claim that he thought that he was pleading guilty to a second degree felony.
The Court found on November 18, and it affirms again today, that Defendant's plea of
guilty was knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's motion because it
finds no good cause for Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
Dated this *7

day of December, 2004.

Michael D. Lyon, Judge /
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2380 Washington Blvd., Suite 230
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Roy D. Cole
Public Defender Association
2562 Washington Blvd.
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Randall W. Richards
Public Defender Association
2562 Washington Blvd.
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(A certified court interpreter translated English spoken
during the proceedings to Spanish, and Spanish to English.)
THE COURT:
All right.

State of Utah versus Marcelino Cruz.

This is the time set for sentencing.

May I

hear your recommendations, please?
MR. COLE:

Yes, Your Honor.

I've gone over the

recommendation in the PSR with Mr. Cruz.
very favorable recommendation.

It is obviously a

I've also spoken with many of

his family members, and I got to tell you, I —

I've

attempted to translate every letter that we got on his
behalf, but there were more than 30 of them attesting to his
good character, attesting to this being outside of his
character.
We're going to ask, Your Honor, that you just give him
credit for time served, serve whatever time in the Weber
County Jail you have him serve, and then allow his
deportation as per the recommendation.
right now.
him —

He's got 70 days in

Maybe after he does 180 days, if you'd allow

immigration to come whenever they're ready.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Do you have anything you want to say, Mr. Cruz?
THE DEFENDANT (through interpreter):
THE COURT:
MR. PARMLEY:

No.

Does the State wish to be heard?
Your Honor, I disagree with the
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recommendations.
THE DEFENDANT (through interpreter) : The worst
thing for me is —

is being separated from my family.

MR. PARMLEY:

My recollection, Your Honor, is that I

previously addressed the facts when the Court took the plea
of guilty in this case.

And my view of it was that itfs so

serious that it warrants commitment to the prison.
My reason for that was the very, very large quantity of
controlled substances that were in the possession of the
defendant.

The cocaine, as I recall, was 92 grams. And 92
c
grams represents a good three to four ounces. It would be
between three and four ounces, which would represent probably
over 500 hits and have a value I'm thinking of —
think.

No, I'm —

I'm sorry.

That would —

let me

yeah, it would

be three ounces, probably around 400 hits in that quantity,
Your Honor.

And the other one, the n^harrphe^

about

a half ounce._JThat's also a large quantity.
I think that my —

my real concern is that that kind of

substantial quantity, once it hits the streets, causes such
serious problems for the entire community.

And I think that

when we consider just how serious those consequences are, of
trying to get that much controlled substance out onto the
streets.
And the defendant, as I recall, admitted that that was
his intention.

His words to the detective were that —
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1

me see if I can —

2

they saw the word owes in Spanish,

3

evidence as well.

those?
MR. PARMLEY:

7

—

that I had neglected to mention.

And I thought that he'd made an admission.

He may not have.

THE DEFENDANT (through interpreter) :

9
10

—

THE DEFENDANT (through interpreter) : What are

5

8

These were collected as

There was also over a pound of marijuana that I had

4

6

they found what they call owe sheets where

They say that

there was a list?
MR. PARMLEY:

11

He was on his way —

according to the

12

police report, he said he was on his way to entregar or drop

13/

off or deliver the marijuana and the cocaine he possessed in
the vehicle.

He said that he was a user of both cocaine and

15

methamphetamine, and that he did not sell large quantities of

16

cocaine, only 20 or $40 here and there.

17

selling more because he needed money for his bills.

18 /
19/

He recently began

Those are my concerns, Your Honor, that it's a large
quantity, that he intends on getting it out onto the street,
and it is a first degree felony and I think that it warrants

21

a commitment to the prison.

22

the Court to do in this case.

23
24
25

J

THE COURT:

And that's what we are asking

Thank you.

Mr. Woodring, how much time would he spend down at the
prison if I send him down there on a first degree?

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
(801) 395-1055

5

PROBATION:

You know, I —

Board of Pardons —
they'll do.

I really don't know.

The

it's pretty hard to predict anymore what

I don't know that he'd do the whole five years

before they'd parole him.
MR. COLE:

I have no idea.

What we'd ask the Court to do is if you

don't want to give him credit for the time he's served and
just start the year starting tomorrow morning, that would be
fine, too.
THE COURT:
case.

Let me say this.

This is a difficult

It is not uncommon for this Court to receive

recommendations from the probation department on people who
are here illegally to just put them on court probation

—

give them a suspended prison sentence, place them on court
probation and give them astiff jail sentence and then make
as a condition of court probation that they not return to the
country illegally.
And in some instances involving simple possession
charges or maybe even a small amount that's being
distributed, I sometimes don't have a heartburn with that.
But I think the —

the State today has raised a very good

issue and that is that this was —

it involves a large amount

of narcotics, it was in a drug-free zone, it's a first degree
felony, that maybe from time to time there ought to be an
example made that —

that when you commit a very serious

crime,_which this is, that there ought not to be court
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probation.

There ought to be a prison commitment^ And I

think this is one.
And so I'm going to, in this instance, not follow the
recommendation from the probation department.

And it is the

sentence of this Court, Mr. Cruz, that you be committed to
the Utah State Prison for a period of five years and which
may be for life.
THE DEFENDANT (through interpreter):

Am I going to

be sent there?
THE COURT:

Yes, you are.

Today.

THE DEFENDANT (through interpreter):
THE COURT:

I —

I will recommend that you receive

credit for the time that youfve served.
MR. COLE:
THE COURT:

Why?

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you.

(Proceedings conclude)
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CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

)
) ss.
)

I, Laurie Shingle, do hereby certify that the foregoing
six pages of transcript constitute a true and accurate
record of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge and
ability as a Certified Shorthand Reporter for the Second
Judicial District Court of Weber County in and for the
State of Utah.
Dated at Ogden, Utah, this the 10th day of January,
2005.

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
(801) 395-1055

Addendum D
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CHARGES
2. POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/07/2004 Guilty
HEARING
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present in
custody and represented by Roy Cole.
Defense counsel reports that the defendant has served 70 days in
the Weber County Jail and agrees with the recommendation from Adult
Probation and Parole.
The State responds and requests that the defendant be committed to
the Utah State Prison.
Based on the factual evidence of the case, the Court agrees with
the State.
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Case No: 041905221
Date:
Nov 18, 2004
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS #/INTENT TO DIST
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 1st Degree Felony, the ~de£eHdant is sentenced
to an indeterminate term of not less than five Y^&£& and which may
be life in the Utah State Prison.
^
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transpprtation to the Utah*State Prrson where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends credit for the time that'the defendant has
served.

Dated this p^Jbday of

Ab~-

MICHAEL)D. LYON
District: Court Judge
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